ALTERNATIVE DIPLOMACY

АЛТЕРНАТИВНАТА ДИПЛОМАЦИЯ

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Abstract: Without claiming to be exhaustive, this paper aims at analyzing the tools of alternative (Track II and III diplomacy) for conflict resolution and crisis management. In order to maximize the gains from private diplomacy, the EU should take into account what Track II and III diplomacy has done so far to help solve conflicts, why it is need and how it can best be used.
KEY WORDS: DIPLOMACY, NEGOTIATIONS, PRIVATE, INTERVENTION, EU, MEDIATION, CONFLICT, APPROACH, RESOLUTION, RESULT

1. Introduction

Diplomacy in its multilayered meaning represents a formulation and implementation of foreign politics, technique of foreign politics, international negotiations and professional activity, which is being performed by the diplomats[1] Diplomacy can be simply defined as a primary method with which foreign politics is realized and as normal means of communication in international relations[2]. In representation of one of the authors »the (foreign) politics is a formulation and a direction; and the diplomacy a communication and realization. Diplomacy is responsible for managing the relations between countries and countries and other actors through the assistance of advice, design and realization of foreign politics, coordinating and ensuring specific and wide interests[3]. A diplomatic activity is meant for advancement of national interests with practices of persuasion[4].

Track One Diplomacy or Official Diplomacy has a long history whose roots lie in the remote history of humankind. De Magalhaes (1988) describes Official Diplomacy as, "[a]n instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of contacts between the governments of different states through the use ofintermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties"[5]. The most important feature that distinguishes Track One diplomacy from all other forms of diplomacy is its formal application at the state-to-state level. It follows a certain protocol to which every state is a signatory. Track One Diplomacy is usually considered to be the primary peacemaking tool of a state's foreign policy. It is carried out by diplomats, high-ranking government officials, and heads of states and is aimed at influencing the structures of political power. Also included among the Track One players are the United Nations, the Vatican, and regional economic and political groupings such as the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and many others. Negotiation is sometimes used as a synonym for Official Diplomacy, whereas in fact it is simply a conflict resolution process used by all those mentioned above to resolve conflicts
Traditional diplomacy or Track One Diplomacy has for a long time been complemented by another form of diplomacy called *Track Two Diplomacy[6]*. Like many other conflict resolution theorists and practitioners worried about the failures of Track One Diplomacy, Montville coined the phrase 'Track Two Diplomacy' [7] defines Track Two Diplomacy as, "unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public

opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict"[8] Montville emphasized that Track Two Diplomacy is not a substitute for Track One Diplomacy, but compensates for the constraints imposed on leaders by their people's psychological expectations. Most important, Track Two Diplomacy is intended to provide a bridge or complement official Track One negotiations . Examples of Track Two organisations are Search for Common Ground, West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), and many others.

Track III, finally, consists in people-to-people interactions at the grassroots level to encourage interaction and understanding between communities through meetings, media exposure, political and legal advocacy for marginalised people and communities

2. Discussion

While the practice of private diplomacy (or Track II diplomacy) is not new, it seems to be blossoming with the EU appointing a growing number of envoys and representatives. One of the reasons could be the resurfacing of conflicts that are often intra- rather than inter-state, whose victims are mainly civilians and which are waged with unconventional weapons and methods, including terrorism.
One argument for private diplomacy is that independent, actors can successfully complement or replace governments and international organisations when these (because of restrictive mandates, bureaucracy, or shrinking budgets) are prevented from taking part actively in crisis management and conflict resolution. A second argument is that traditional diplomatic instruments of negotiation, mediation and conflict management have proved to be ineffective, calling for new approaches. Some actors in need of mediation would be more inclined to trust a private diplomat (a small 'entity') rather than a state actor, especially when needing a rapid and swift intervention. Diplomatic missions, an asset to Track One Diplomacy, are normally closed down at the peak of conflicts between countries "thereby reducing communication when it is needed most".[9]

The actors in private diplomacy are private people who are often experienced mediators and negotiators, such as former heads of state or government, who often act through non-state groups, such as think-tanks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector or religious organisations.

NGOs provide early warnings of impending conflicts and often act as information brokers and mediators or facilitators of official or unofficial negotiations. Some are deeply immersed in conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution at the grassroots level, working for and with local populations, bringing relevant information to civil servants who spend most of their time analysing information in Brussels.

The complex institutional set-up of the EU could benefit from the use of parallel diplomatic efforts. The current approach of European diplomacy is multi-dimensional, involving the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the EU presidency. If decisions are taken through this complicated diplomatic machinery, they could actually have a strong impact on third countries. But more often than not, such a heavy decision-making structure hampers rather than facilitates crisis management and too often it does not produce quick results.

There is currently a large number of hot conflicts across the world. The Council has nine special representatives at its disposal. The Commission has two. EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) perform essential third-party roles in crisis regions. They are classified as Track 1.5 facilitators since only few EUSRs have been clearly mandated to "mediate"[10]. Nevertheless, they "provide a direct communications channel and can act as mediators and facilitators with actors with whom the EU cannot deal through official channels" (MediatEUr 2012, 3). Several EUSRs have actually benefited from the constructive ambiguity in the formulation of their mandate (MediatEUr 2012), as it has provided them with considerable leeway in the conduct of their diplomatic activities, including the facilitation of formal and informal dialogue encounters.

In the countries under study in this research, several EUSRs were explicitly appointed to assist international mediation efforts. The position of EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia was established in 2008 to prepare international talks and increase the visibility of the EU's role in the peace process [11]The current office holder (EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia) has a broader mandate to "contribute to a peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region, including the crisis in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict", notably by co-chairing the Geneva International Discussions on the consequences of the 2008 conflict in Georgia (Council of the European Union 2014). The EUSR for the Sahel is also mandated among many other tasks to "contribute to regional and international efforts to facilitate the resolution of the [Mali] crisis, in particular the implementation of the roadmap for the political transition, a free and transparent electoral process and a credible national inclusive dialogue" (Council of the European Union 2013).

The senior staff of CSDP missions is also well placed to perform Track II facilitation functions. These missions, which usually intervene in post-war contexts with a security enhancement mandate, are designed to conduct activities "conducive to achieving political settlement, to implementing the provisions of a peace agreement or to sustaining confidence in the peace process"[12]. Therefore, while they are not mandated to directly engage in Track I mediation, CSDN mission staff have constant working relationships with government officials and representatives from civil society, and thus have the potential to impact Track I.5-, II-and III-level mediation[13]. For example, within the format of 'Incidence Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM)' the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia

(EUMM) was tasked to host meetings to discuss the security situation at the border between South Ossetia and Abkhazia with Georgia, attended by relevant authorities from all parties, in order to mitigate future security clashes. Hence, the EUMM was effectively engaged in dispute resolution

Finally, EU Delegations in conflict-affected third countries maintain a permanent dialogue with local stakeholders. In Yemen, until the 2015 crisis, EU in-country delegates have been "facilitating events and meetings of the conflict parties at the Delegation facilities in Sana'a, which they understood as opportunities to listen and to understand their views and demands.

In so doing, they offered an informal setting for discussion...These events did not act upon a formal mandate but helped to establish communication between the disputants, which can be situated in the realm of dialogue" [14]

3. Conclusion

The EU could unlock the enormous potential of networks active in the field of crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation. In addition, the Conflict Prevention Partnership, a co-operative effort by think-tanks and NGOs active in the field of peace-building, is a first step towards establishing a partnershipwith the Commission that focuses on real added value, beyond the traditional seminars and information-related activities. In order to maximise the gains from private diplomacy, the EU should assess what

Track II-and III diplomacy has done so far to help solve conflicts, why it is needed and how it can best be used. Such insights will help the EU devise a strategy for private diplomacy and improve its capacity to solve crises.

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