

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY

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Abstract: *There are three key moments for the development of security and defense globally: First is dynamics of events in the new security environment, second is the importance of so-called "Events leading to change" in the environment and third is the degree of ability of the Parties to anticipate certain situations related to security challenges.*

The need for a strategic reconsideration of the security environment and for EU-NATO interaction calls for consideration of the challenges and problems facing the CSDP and the Alliance to improve their joint security work.

Keywords: ECONOMIC, SECURITY, DEFENCE, POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW

1. Introduction

Following the onset of the economic and financial crisis, the focus of both the leaders and the citizens of the EU and the US shifts to addressing its consequences.

As part of a public opinion poll conducted in 2011, the question of who should be the priority of the US president and the European leaders - both sides of the Atlantic identified as a major problem the tackling of the economic crisis. Secondly, the issue of dealing with international terrorism was raised. Thirdly, combating climate change is becoming more and more important for European leaders and the EU's population [1].

If these questions are raised today, following the situation in Ukraine and the Middle East, the answers may be different, but it is interesting to note that in 2011 relations with Russia were mentioned as a priority by only 1-2% of the US and the EU citizens.

This outlines three key moments for the development of security and defense globally:

- Dynamics of events in the new security environment;
- The importance of so-called "Events leading to change" in the environment;
- The degree of ability of the Parties to anticipate certain situations related to security challenges.

The need for a strategic reconsideration of the security environment and for EU-NATO interaction calls for consideration of the challenges and problems facing the CSDP and the Alliance to improve their joint security work.

2. The challenges from an economic and financial point of view

2.1. The effect of the reduction of national budgets allocated to defense

As a result of the financial crisis, defense expenditure in most Western European countries is decreasing with the start of the excessive deficit procedure. In the Central and Eastern European countries, however, the reduction in military spending is faster and in larger volumes as they are economically weaker and harder to maintain high levels of budget deficit.

The high degree of interdependence between Member States, due to integration policy, economic and social cohesion, implies that appropriate decisions are made for closer contact, exchange of information and agreement on strategic priorities across sectors.

In the long run, even if the economic crisis is overcome, the challenge of defense budgets will continue to be on the agenda as military equipment is becoming more expensive and prices are rising faster than inflation and gross (GDP) of the Parties.

Intelligent Defense Initiatives and Merging and Sharing are the possible working solutions of NATO and the EU, as the two organizations are finding it increasingly difficult to acquire new ones and retain their current capabilities. On the other hand, the finance ministers and the national parliaments of the Member States having the final say in voting on their budgets are less and less inclined to return their defense levels to their previous levels and at best keep them at present.

An additional argument for the need for pooling and sharing, making smart decisions within both organizations - NATO and the EU - is the proportion of defense spending between NATO and EU allies showing a strong imbalance between US funding and European Union - especially in the period of the economic crisis. The frequent appeals, mainly stemming from the United States, that 2% of GDP being earmarked by Alliance member countries, are often ignored. This leads the Americans to ask whether their allies have the will and the potential to mobilize the resources needed for their common security. From the US point of view, Europe is demilitarized and has the impression that it is divided and focused on itself. Insufficient EU defense budgets obstruct overall security objectives.

In recent years, European defense budgets have been decreasing, releasing resources for other economic sectors. At the same time, the parties can not afford, through financial restrictions and deprivations, a security deficit. An interesting trend in this direction is also observed in the study of the so- Transatlantic trends, namely that when asked by Europeans whether their governments need to increase, maintain current levels, or reduce defense spending in general, the majority of respondents choose the option of maintaining or reducing overall [2].

It is therefore necessary to spend money in a new way, focusing on multinational cooperation and decision-making through prioritization and specialization.

2.2 The future of the European defense industry development

The development of a single European defense production market (EOPP) is gaining momentum in recent years due to Europe's lagging behind in the defense technology industry. This trend is mainly the result of the strongly reduced investment costs of EU member states and the excessive share of duplication of effort and investment. The existence of many independent national military-industrial complexes and defense markets forms a fragmented, economically inefficient and uncompetitive European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EOTB).

The EU merger and sharing initiative depends on two factors:

- effective liberalization of the European defense market leads to more competition between companies in the sector, which requires overcoming national controversy over a common defense budget;
- the need for significant improvements in European defense cooperation with the aim of diversifying technical military equipment.

The lack of a single European arms market as well as the existing restrictions direct the focus entirely to the defense national interests of member states and their industries, which often leads to duplication and low level of compatibility in pan-European operations and missions.

It is clear that there is a lack of strategic evaluation in the EU on a European Defense Technological and Industrial Base, in view of the high level of cohesion, the differences in the national

strategic culture and the lack of coordination among the Member States, especially in the acquisition of new technologies.

In this way, EU hard-hitting businesses can compete with those of the United States and the world market respectively, as national governments have a strong influence on company strategies and not always national interest is in the context of pan-European and/or transatlantic. At the same time, they are coordinated only for certain cases, in the absence of a strict and clear mechanism [3].

The dynamics of the real EU policy show that the new requirements for the Armed Forces of the EU Member States are related to the acquisition of capabilities across the spectrum of missions and tasks. The increased requirements of international and multinational operations, network operations and cyber security, space-based systems, intelligence and early warning systems and strategic air transport require the development and deployment of new technologies.

For the EU to be a global player in the defense industry, it is necessary to define the strategic priorities for individual Member States, which are the key competences for each of them, but in the context of the whole, of the European defense system and oriented towards efficiency and effectiveness.

The conclusions reached by many stakeholders are that the patronage of national industry leads to loss and inefficiency. In this respect, a more open market would help European defense industries to be more efficient and cooperate to a much higher degree. Intelligent defense in this regard could be of further benefit in the implementation of joint projects.

2.3. European financing of operations

The regulatory framework for financing civilian ESDP operations is contained in the Commission's Communication to the Council and Parliament on the financing of civilian crisis management operations[4]. It differentiates between: missions (delivery of humanitarian aid, consolidation of democracy, etc.), which are financed by the Community budget, in view of which the EP has strengthened control powers. But missions related to disarmament, support to local police authorities, etc., where part of the funding is possible to absorb from the budget of individual member states, are under scrutiny by MEPs.

The joint action adopted by the Council sets out the way in which the costs between the Community and the budget of the Member States should be allocated. It is possible that expenditure will be borne by Member States when the EU joint operation is specific in view of its location and objectives. In these cases, there is some difficulty, as there is no Community mechanism to manage and direct national funding.

With regard to military operations, the funding of "Community expenditure" through the ATHENA mechanism should be distinguished from that of individual Member States. The ATHENA mechanism, set up by the Council in 2007, is a joint fund at European level to finance military operations under the Security and Defense Policy. Generally speaking, not only those for the preparatory phase, such as exploration and acquaintance missions (transport, accommodation) but also costs in the active period of action, should be understood. These costs are secured by advance payments by the Member States through the ATHENA mechanism in the form of installments determined on a percentage basis according to their Gross Domestic Product.

In the European budget 2014-2020, the so-called The Union's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) provides the opportunity for EU research and technology related to dual use of industrial products which provides a good perspective and enables a more coherent and coordinated approach among Member States, and to achieve real interaction in the field of defense research.

The development of this opportunity in turn would help build the necessary capabilities to protect peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security as well as crisis management activities, strengthen the defense technological and industrial base and improve efficiency of military expenditure. This would increase efficiency in the use of research and development, facilitating the pooling and sharing of capabilities, functional specialization,

building joint capabilities, multinational joint management of forces and resources, etc. In this respect, in the new EU Research and Innovation Program (2014-2020) Horizon 2020, a recommendation has been made for more research and investment in dual-use technologies. A similar call was made in a number of European Parliament documents.

Taking into account that technology and science are at the root of defense, investment in research and development currently being earmarked by Member States is extremely limited[5].

At a time when the challenges are global, nearly 80% of European research and development is carried out through national programs. However, if a larger share is spent on multinational projects, then the effect would be greater and smaller resource-intensive countries would contribute to the overall effort by taking advantage of an information infrastructure that they would not be able to build on themselves. This requires a strategic vision and a rethinking of the European Security Strategy, taking into account the above.

Currently, the European Defense Agency has defined the following areas where efforts should be made to build capacities of member states:

- Ground surveillance;
- Cyber security;
- Development of unmanned aerial systems;
- Health (telemedicine and robotics);
- Energy;
- Crisis management.

A major challenge is also the difference between the "old" and the "new" EU member states in terms of their abilities and resources devoted to defense. The armaments and operational procedures of the latter are in a transitional period between standards, in line with their former commitments under the Warsaw Treaty and the new standards of modernization and investment of large resources. The set NATO criteria for 2% of GDP to be earmarked for defense are incomparable in real terms with the same percentage in the old member states. This leads to a lack of sufficient resources for the purchase of new equipment whose prices are formed on the free market, despite the strong need for modernization.

Challenges from an economic and financial point of view demonstrate the need for better coordination between actors, specialization and standardization, optimization of resources and costs, i.e. not spending more, but spending wiser. This implies synergy between NATO intelligent defense initiatives and EU uniting and sharing, reducing defense expenditure by increasing multilateral forms of cooperation.

3. The challenges from a political point of view

3.1. Obstacles to the EU-NATO in the context of Cyprus-Turkey relations

Turkey is one of the countries that participated in EU missions, counting a significant contribution to the largest Althea military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.

However, cooperation in the area of CSDP has important problematic and unresolved issues. The occupation of Northern Cyprus, the state of relations with the state of Israel, and the Kurdish issue are still on the agenda of EU-Turkey relations.

Another major problem is that Turkey is not allowed into the European Defense Agency's planning and decision-making process, as there is no agreement signed with Norway, also a member of NATO. There is a tendency to isolate Turkey from participating in the EU decision-making process on planning and conducting EU operations under the CSDP without regard to its status as a candidate country and a major player in European operations.

Turkey, in turn, does not officially recognize the Republic of Cyprus and does not maintain diplomatic relations with it. For its part, Cyprus does not participate in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and therefore there is no signed agreement with NATO on the exchange of classified information.

Under the rules set out in the 2002 Copenhagen EU Council Declaration, only NATO member states or PfP members can participate in the discussions on security and defense issues falling within this framework, and which have signed agreements for the exchange of classified information with the Alliance.

This gives Turkey a formal reason to block Cyprus' access to NATO classified information, which significantly impedes the exchange of information and the development of operational cooperation between NATO and the EU. On the other hand, the EU believes that Turkey needs to take more visible steps to normalize political-military relations in line with established practice in all democratic countries.

Potential proposals to improve cooperation have strengthened and a meaningful dialogue between the EU and Turkey; further enhancing cooperation on capabilities; signing a security agreement with Ankara and Turkey's participation in the work of the European Defense Agency; full and full participation of Cyprus in the strategic dialogue between the two organizations.

3.2. Trust in politicians and public opinion

Due to the danger of electoral exodus in public criticism for increased defense spending and/or loss of autonomy and sovereignty in the defense field, many politicians, especially European, tend to reduce security and defense. They also prefer to be more cautious in supporting and participating in more internal integration initiatives. For this reason, defense expenditure is very often limited, but no long-term analysis is needed on the need for specific reductions. At the same time, maintaining public support for national, regional and global security engagements is of fundamental importance.

Looking at the information environment today, it is clear that it is different. In the era of high technology and the Internet, it is almost impossible to distort information and spread propaganda that is characteristic of a previous historical period. Of course, this is also related to the education of critical thinking in the citizens, so that they can sift the facts of the "distorted truth" in the vast amount of information.

But at the same time, the power of social media and the importance of the virtual world are also being used by radical, terrorist groups influencing people's fears, beliefs, souls and minds. The speed of transmission of information and subsequent reactions is of great importance. This, in turn, is both a challenge and an opportunity for collective defense and security organizations to take a different approach to implementing their policy, notably through public diplomacy and numerous information campaigns for the public.

In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are key components to policy making, transparency in meeting EU commitments across borders is very significant in generating support among their citizens. It is very important for governments, national parliaments and European institutions to be able to explain the importance of contributing to "home security" through the participation of missions outside the EU. In this connection, increasing efficiency gains the so-called an integrated approach to crisis planning and management, where interaction between civilian and military forces is observed. Civilian-military missions are more easily grounded in the public space and find greater political support. In financial terms, they allow funding from the European Commission, including the acquisition of assets, technical assets and services necessary for the operation, while military operations are provided by Member States through ATHENA.

In operational terms, in order to compensate for some of the more specific weaknesses of the existing mechanisms in the EU, a permanent civilian-military structure should be developed to bring together both the preliminary preparation of potential crises and the fulfillment of the tasks planning and managing operations at a strategic level.

In the context of NATO-EU interaction, it is necessary to develop criteria to help deciding which organization has a leading role in what kind of crises, in order to protect the security and

defense of citizens. This clarity would contribute to generating public support for the missions and operations of the two Unions.

In this respect, more public diplomacy, transparency, and community information campaigns are needed to accrue more support for security and defense expenditure and the necessary reforms to be made to ensure the security of European citizens. Forming a European identity on European defense and security issues is an additional element to be built through such instruments.

3.3. Different perceptions of threat and security

The present-day security risks and threats are a complex tangle of variable hazards. International terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), fragile states, stubborn unsolvable conflicts, organized crime, cyber-space and energy supply threats, natural disasters and man-made accidents, pandemics pose security risks.

The definition of a unified approach and action of the EU on the global stage is also related to the question of what Europeans perceive for the world [6]. This in turn is related to the formation of a European identity in the area of security and defense.

In this regard, it should be noted that there are two interesting differences, on the one hand, in the perceptions and attitudes of the member states themselves, part of the EU and NATO, and on the other hand between those of the United States and the European countries. The great powers naturally look different to the world, unlike the small ones. They identify risks and threats differently, define security in different ways, and build different levels of tolerance towards insecurity. Those with greater military power perceive power as a useful tool in international relations while the weaker ones perceive it in a slightly different way.

In fact, the strong ones trust strength more than necessary. On the other hand, states deprived of military power face the reverse danger. The viewpoints and the psychological attitudes of power and weakness explain a lot, though not everything, of what today separates the United States and Europe to some extent and provoke their different approaches to threats. Confirmation of what has been said can be traced back to exploring the views of EU and US citizens and leaders, pointing out the unequivocal differences between the views of those on both sides of the Atlantic.

To the question to what extent do you agree with the following: Under certain conditions, war is necessary to triumph justice? 46% of US respondents have responded "fully," while only 9% of EU citizens have said "totally agree" [7].

The existing differences between Europe and the United States are not value-based, more or less they lie in politics.

After the damage caused by two world wars in the 20th century, Europeans have an instinctive desire to avoid military conflict as a way of solving problems. Europe is guided by the "logic of peace" in contrast to the US "logic of war".

A further example that policy analysis is at the heart of different approaches is the European understanding of the UN as the sole source of legitimacy for an armed conflict or the international recognition of a government. This is not covered by the American view of US freedom in the use of military force. The principle of "preventive strike" laid down in the American doctrine is met with restraint in most European capitals. Europeans also see a smaller relative role of purely military means in the fight against terrorism.

Europeans underestimate the psychological impact that the 11 September events have on Americans and decision-makers. The US desire to find and punish the "guilty" is enormous and the resulting actions are not always justified by Europeans. This also raises the question of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was first activated after the events of 9/11 - how much so. "General defense clause" in Art. 42 point 7 of the Lisbon Treaty would have the same application.

In defining the term "War on Terrorism" or "Combating Terrorism", there is also a difference in the US and EU approach to overcoming this asymmetric threat. In the first case, terrorism is defined as "War," respectively, the Laws of War are supposed and

enforced, and in the latter is defined as criminal activity, and that is why we are talking about "Fighting," in which the "Law of Peace" prevail. According to the United States, a war against terrorism has to be waged. The main role in this war is the army, through military operations, with the most powerful and modern weapons (i.e. it is the task of the Ministry of Defense). According to Europe, terrorism should be countered as a criminal activity - to treat terrorists as criminal criminals and to fight them by respecting the laws and human rights. The main institutions in this case are judicial and law enforcement, but especially the police and special services. While the role of the army, the military is only complementary and auxiliary.

A similar trend is also observed in the European Commission's proposal for a European Security Program, which proposes to strengthen the role of Europol through the establishment of a European Counter-Terrorism Center for the exchange of information between national law enforcement authorities, based on the successful experience of the European Cybercrime Center. Particular attention is paid to the fact that in the context of the crises and conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Libya, terrorist groups are joined by European citizens who, on their return home, can pose a significant danger [8].

The very focus on "threats" distinguishes Americans from their European counterparts. Americans, writes Stephen Evertz, talk of external "threats" such as "spreading weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and bandits" called by Bush "Axis of Evil". While Europeans are focusing on "ethnic conflicts, migration, organized crime, poverty and the destruction of the natural environment", challenges to which they have the potential to respond [9].

According to a number of politicians, the EU is perceived primarily as a "civilian" force, with mainly economic and diplomatic means, which can "win without an army". EU concentration on "soft aspects of security" can have comparative advantages. These include the beneficial impact of the enlargement of the Union, the considerable funds earmarked for development aid, peacekeeping and funding of programs for international institutions, in particular all possible non-military means of preserving stability and security.

Despite the above mentioned differences in perceptions and approaches, today more than ever requires close transatlantic co-operation to be made by American and European decision-makers. The EU should create its own concepts within the transatlantic alliance and develop its own institutional process and capabilities so as to further contribute to the development of the Alliance as an equal partner.

4. Conclusion

The progressive strengthening of integration processes in the field of European security and defense is inevitably linked to the assumption of new responsibilities and to the contribution to solving individual regional problems or crises. The successful EU entry into this framework is linked to strengthening the democratic control of the sector.

The challenges are related to two main points. On the one hand, with the low tendency of national parliaments, even after stabilization from the economic and financial crisis, to vote for higher defense budgets. That is mainly due to the prioritization of social and economic costs.

On the other hand, the gradually enhancing integration processes in the defense sector could lead to a limitation of the role of the national state at a later stage and, respectively, to weakening the control powers of national parliaments.

As a problem with the defense policy of the European countries, the conservative approach and the delayed reform process that the new realities impose are noted. The somewhat strong influence of the military-industrial complexes in individual countries is also an obstacle to the reforms within them and to the so called intelligent defense. Moreover, the desire to sell production leads to exports to third developing countries, which in turn favors the emergence and maintenance of conflict points[10].

The increasing connectivity in the world leads to the fact that the boundaries between internal and external security are blurring. Climate change and resource shortages combined with demographic growth and weak statehood can also lead to conflict and instability around the world.

At the same time, transatlantic relations are changing. The task of improving European security is at the forefront of the European level. Together with the United States and with other countries, Europe is responsible for peace and security in the world. The EU must continue to work together with its partners, but we should be able to act independently if necessary.

Achieving Europe's strategic independence requires that more resources be spent on defense and that the funds be used better and with the joint efforts of the Member States. In this regard, it can be said that the United States is already investing more than twice as much defense for all EU Member States combined and increasing its budget by almost 10% in 2018. China has increased its budget by 150% in the last decade, and in 2017 the increase is 7% while at the same time Russia invests 5.4% of its GDP for defense in 2017 [11].

EU leaders must make a commitment to strengthening the European security and defense that European citizens expect. Public opinion polls clearly show that security has become the greatest concern for most European citizens, although the causes of insecurity vary from one Member State to another.

Europeans also agree that collective action between European countries is absolutely necessary for their security. When goods, services, money and people move freely, security can not be considered alone or fully guaranteed by the Member States' autonomous actions. The message of Europeans is extremely clear: security and defense should be an integral part of the EU's core.

In a world that is interconnected, controversial and complex, EU Member States are simply too small to act on their own. Continental-size forces are much better suited than small- or medium-sized states.

This is even more important, provided that the pressure on national budgets remains high. The tension between fiscal constraints and competing public policy priorities continues to characterize the political economy of many Member States. At the same time, competition among global industrial forces is growing, which requires more efficient use of resources. If Europe wants to be competitive on a global scale, it will have to unite and integrate its best industrial and technological capabilities.

Technological changes dramatically alter the nature and picture of security and defense. Large information masses, unmanned vehicles and artificial intelligence bring revolutionary changes to the defense sector. They also increase the technological performance of the civilian defense sector. However, the availability of such relatively affordable technologies also allows the rapid growth of unconventional, transnational and asymmetric threats such as hybrid, terrorist, cyber, chemical, biological and radiological attacks. The sharp increase in Internet users has made cybercrime and Internet use for terrorism a new border of the 21st century war.

Looking ahead, an effective European security and defense policy must be based on the efficient coordination of significant R & D investment. This will help keep up with the new trends and create the technological and industrial capabilities that Europe needs in order to guarantee its strategic independence in security and defense.

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