Nuclear Deterrence. Is It Back?

  • 1 National University of Public Service, Hungary


During the Cold War, the concept of deterrence was often used as a term for nuclear deterrence with the use of nuclear weapons, but the term fell into relative obscurity, in broad strokes, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thereafter, nuclear forces tended to play a marginal and diminishing role for many policymakers in the 1990s and 2000s. The topic of nuclear weapons has not been included in political debates of the countries for more than twenty years. Therefore, the threat of nuclear weapons appeared remote and debates often centred on a nuclear-free world’s possibility of proliferation and expectations. However,over the past few years though, this has changed significantly. The primary and regional powers are increasingly modernising their nuclear forces and are starting to give them a central role in their large strategic positions. Nuclear deterrence has come up again in such a setting



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