Security & Future
Vol. 7 (2023), Issue 1

Table of Contents

  • THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITY

    • Organizational resilience and critical infrastructure security systems

      pg(s) 3-5

      The identification and protection of critical infrastructure (CI), which provides essential services for the national and European markets, especially in key sectors of the economy, requires priority measures to be taken to increase its resilience. The concept of resilience is closely related to the ability of a CI to prevent, defend against, respond to, withstand, mitigate and absorb, adapt to, or recover from risk events. Here, both the organizational measures and the technical part of the security systems, developed according to the specifics of CI, play an essential role.
      In this regard, this publication presents the framework of the author’s view on the relationship between organizational resilience and CI security.

    • A coordinated approach to achieve a higher overall level of resilience and protection of critical infrastructure

      pg(s) 6-8

      Developing a coordinated and effective response to critical infrastructure (CI) threats, current and anticipated, requires achieving a higher overall level of resilience and protection. The growing interdependence between physical and digital infrastructure creates opportunities for malicious cyberspace actions targeting critical areas to disrupt functionality or damage physical infrastructure. In this regard, through the application of specific approaches to strengthen the resilience of CIs, it is possible to improve the capabilities to counter physical and hybrid threats.
      Presenting an option for an effective response agai nst CI threats through the development of security systems is the content of this publication.

    • Model of the Whistleblower Protection System

      pg(s) 9-11

      The construction of the system for the protection of whistleblowers is in accordance with the legal framework of the Republic of
      Bulgaria and the EU Directive.
      The report defines a multi-layered model of the protection system, including:
      – Information on violations;
      – Persons who granted protection:
      – Obliged entities, including:
      – Employers in the public and private sector;
      – Institutions, bodies, services and agencies of the EU;
      – European Commission.
      Signaling channels, duties and functional interactions between the main elements of the model are structured. A mechanism for
      synchronizing and controlling signal processing activities s presented. The model is a theoretical basis for the construction and functioning
      of the whistleblower protection system.

  • NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

    • Safety and security measures during transportation of dangerous goods class 7 (radioactive materials), taking into account the requirements of ADR

      pg(s) 12-14

      Providing a VVER-1000 type NPP with the required amount of Fresh Nuclear Fuel (FNF) for any Nuclear Reactor System (NRS) energy campaign is of primary importance and is an element of the security of supply and the reliable operation of a NPP. According to the definitions in the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), FNF is dangerous cargo because it contains substances that are permitted for road transportation only under certain conditions. The transportation of FNF on Bulgaria’s roads is carried out in strict compliance with the requirements of ADR.

    • Safety and security measures during transportation of dangerous goods class 7 (radioactive materials), taking into account the requirements of ADN

      pg(s) 15-17

      One of the main continuous processes occurring in the operation of a nuclear power plant (NPP) is the normal provision of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC). The NFC includes all activities performed with Nuclear Fuel (NF) from the time of uranium mining and includes enrichment, fabrication of fuel assemblies, transportation, operation in a reactor plant as well as processing, disposal, storage or disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The storage and reprocessing or disposal of SNF is the subject of a national strategy for the use of nuclear fuel. In most versions of the nuclear fuel strategies, transport of certain quantities of SNF from the reactor to the designated storage, processing or disposal site is envisaged. This transport may range from a few hundred meters to thousands of kilometers. In practice, land and water transport are mainly used. In both cases, the transport must be carried out in strict compliance with all safety and security requirements

    • Maritime piracy and armed robbery evolution in 2008-2022

      pg(s) 18-21

      Maritime crime (piracy and armed robberies against vessels) are challenges to the shipping that have global impact on maritime trade and security. The evolution of this phenomenon is a dynamic process which is characterized by rapid changes both in terms of the number and severity of incidents and in their geographical concentration. This study traces the development of maritime crime over the past 15 years, divided into three 5-year periods. It is performed by analyzing the data collected and published by the International Maritime Bureau, concerning the number, character and location of incidents for the 2008-2022, in order to outline the trends in the contemporary sea piracy and armed robbery.

  • TECHNICAL FACILITIES FOR ENSURING SECURITY

    • Flood risk assessment and management through a water management information system

      pg(s) 22-24

      Floods are the most common natural disasters on the territory of Bulgaria. As a temporary flooding of a significant part of the land as a result of the action of natural forces, destruction of hydro technical facilities (dam walls, dams) or other critical situations (accidents), these are events with a great possibility of prevention and mitigation of negative effects, since unlike other natural disasters, they are highly predictable. In many cases, the timing, nature and expected sizes can be determined in advance, which, together with the preparation of the population for response and crisis management measures, are part of the complex activity of Flood Protection. The researched information system for water management is part of the measures for the effective management of the risk of floods in the territory of the Municipality of Burgas, as the most frequently occurring disaster in the territory of the Municipality, related to large material damages, destruction and casualties. Photos of the operation of the system in real conditions of rising waters of the monitored water bodies are presented, as well as the actions aimed at controlling the negative effects of the disaster.