International Scientific Journals
of Scientific Technical Union of Mechanical Engineering "Industry 4.0"

The Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) is a logically structured process based on job analysis whose aim is to ensure that the personnel have the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes to effectively perform their assigned tasks. The SAT is a flexible system that can be adapted to the needs of any nuclear power plant and any job position.

According to Art. 3 of the Bulgarian Safe Use of Nuclear Energy Act, nuclear energy and ionizing radiation are used in accordance with the requirements and principles of nuclear safety and radiation protection in order to ensure the protection of human life, health and living conditions of current and future generations, the environment and material values from the harmful impact of ionizing radiation. Persons responsible for facilities and activities under this Act shall establish and maintain an effective safety management system.

The role of management at a nuclear facility is to perform functions such as planning, organizing, staffing, leading and directing work, controlling, monitoring and assessing work and evaluating results. Management systems are methods, processes and tools used by the managers of a nuclear facility to create a framework to carry out work in a safe and secure manner while ensuring that the objectives of the facility operator are achieved within the legal and regulatory framework of the country.

One of the main continuous processes occurring in the operation of a nuclear power plant (NPP) is the normal provision of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC). The NFC includes all activities performed with Nuclear Fuel (NF) from the time of uranium mining and includes enrichment, fabrication of fuel assemblies, transportation, operation in a reactor plant as well as processing, disposal, storage or disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The storage and reprocessing or disposal of SNF is the subject of a national strategy for the use of nuclear fuel. In most versions of the nuclear fuel strategies, transport of certain quantities of SNF from the reactor to the designated storage, processing or disposal site is envisaged. This transport may range from a few hundred meters to thousands of kilometers. In practice, land and water transport are mainly used. In both cases, the transport must be carried out in strict compliance with all safety and security requirements

Providing a VVER-1000 type NPP with the required amount of Fresh Nuclear Fuel (FNF) for any Nuclear Reactor System (NRS) energy campaign is of primary importance and is an element of the security of supply and the reliable operation of a NPP. According to the definitions in the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), FNF is dangerous cargo because it contains substances that are permitted for road transportation only under certain conditions. The transportation of FNF on Bulgaria’s roads is carried out in strict compliance with the requirements of ADR.

The possibility that nuclear or other radioactive material could be used for malicious purposes cannot be ruled out in the current global situation. Operators have responded to this risk by engaging in a collective commitment to strengthen the protection and control of such material and to effectively respond to nuclear security events. Nuclear security is fundamental in the management of nuclear technologies and in applications where nuclear or other radioactive material is used or transported. Identification of vital areas is an important step in the process of protecting against sabotage. Vital area identification (VAI) is the process of identifying the areas in a nuclear facility around which protection will be provided in order to prevent or reduce the likelihood of sabotage.

The protection of nuclear installations against malicious acts can take a number of different forms. This report addresses only issues related to the sabotage of nuclear facilities – prevention or mitigation of sequences initiated by malicious acts that may have potential radiological consequences. Nuclear power plants have good physical protection systems (PPSs) and procedures, and they are designed to minimize the likelihood of an accident and in the event of an accident, not to release radioactive material in an uncontrolled manner. The objective of this report is to provide methods for evaluating and for proposing corrective actions aimed at reducing the risk related to any malicious act that, directed against a nuclear power plant, could endanger the health and safety of plant personnel, the public and the environment.