• 1 University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies in Belgrade
  • 2 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia


This work is inspired by the current problems of confronting organized crime, which in part controls illegal markets. Thus, it is also aimed at highlighting the most significant aspects of the research into illegal markets, whose knowledge enables the creation of effective strategic preferences in the fight against organized crime, whose actions have a number of negative implications for state security. Modern criminal organizations are profitable and market-oriented, and the methods of acting used are combined with the criminal and method of the operation of contemporary business organizations. The knowledge of the organization’s specifics and functioning of illegal markets enables the proper selection of methods to more efficiently counter the destructive actions of criminal organizations that control the illegal market. In fact, the destructive action of criminal organizations reflects directly on the state of security by increasing the level of corruption, the level of money laundering and the infiltration of organized crime into legal economic flows, the spread of illegal markets and the increase of the crime rate, but also the ability to generate criminal profits, increasing the economic power of criminal structures that is recursively used for influence on government holders.



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